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I 
Virtue ethics tells us to act “in accordance with virtue, by which I mean contrary 
to no virtue.”1But which are the virtues? Broadly, we might agree with Aristotle 
Nicomachean Ethics 1106b36that nothing can be a moral virtue unless it is “a 
disposition of choice”, a character-trait that works to transmit our values into our 
actions; but consensus looks harder to come by when we try to get beyond this 
rather simple and obvious necessary condition. Or perhaps we will not even get 
this far: Hume notoriously defines a virtue as any trait the disinterested 
contemplation of which produces in us “the pleasing sentiment of 
approbation”.2As is well-known, this seems to capture a much wider class of traits 
than Aristotle’s necessary condition does. 
Beyond these points, one obvious problem for virtue ethics is the relativist 
worry wherethe virtue ethicist gets her list of virtues from: “what historical 
enquiry discloses is the situatedness of all enquiry, the extent to which what are 
taken to be the standards of truth and of rational justification in the contexts of 
                                           
1 P. Foot, Virtues and Vices, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2002, p. 14. 
2 “[M]orality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or 
quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary.” 
(Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Appendix 1, p. 10) Query: is it morality that does 
this defining? Or sentiment? Probably the latter, but Hume’s “it” is ambiguous.  
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practice vary from one time to another”.3 There is research that gives 
quantitative-analysis evidence of changing language about which are the virtues, 
and which ones matter most, even within one society, the US, during the twentieth 
century: 
A study by Pelin Kesebir and Selin Kesebir found that general moral terms 
like “virtue,” “decency” and “conscience” were used less frequently over the 
course of the 20th century. Words associated with moral excellence, like 
“honesty,” “patience” and “compassion” were used much less frequently. The 
Kesebirs identified 50 words associated with moral virtue and found that 74 
percent were used less frequently as the century progressed. Certain types of 
virtues were especially hard hit. Usage of courage words like “bravery” and 
“fortitude” fell by 66 percent. Usage of gratitude words like “thankfulness” 
and “appreciation” dropped by 49 percent. Usage of humility words like 
“modesty” and “humbleness” dropped by 52 percent. Usage of compassion 
words like “kindness” and “helpfulness” dropped by 56 percent. Meanwhile, 
usage of words associated with the ability to deliver, like “discipline” and 
“dependability” rose over the century, as did the usage of words associated 
with fairness. The Kesebirs point out that these sorts of virtues are most 
relevant to economic production and exchange.4 
Of course there is a sense in which this kind of finding is not news. Different 
societies have always had different lists of virtues. Classical Greece had the four 
cardinal virtues justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom - and in earlier lists, 
holiness/ piety as well. Christian Rome, and its successor civilization, has the three 
theological virtues faith, hope, and charity. (Alasdair MacIntyre famously wrote 
that “Aristotle would certainly not have admired Jesus Christ and he would have 
been horrified by St Paul”: AV p.184.)Some say that the Jewish tradition today 
recognizes six virtues: justice, truth, peace, loving-kindness, compassion, self-
respect.5 Elsewhere in world history, Confucianism recognizes humanity, 
propriety, beneficence, reverence, practical wisdom, selflessness, and 
exemplariness.6 Buddhism sometimes gives us a list of three virtues (detachment, 
mindfulness, pity7), sometimes a list of ten (good habituation, study, keeping good 
company, teach ability, helpfulness, truthfulness, industry, contentment, 
                                           
3 A. MacIntyre, appealing to Robin Collingwood in the Prologue to After Virtue, 3rd edition, 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2007. 
4David Brooks, “Opinion: What our words tell us”, New York Times May 20 2013. Online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/opinion/brooks-what-our-words-tell-us.html?hpw&_r=2 . Thanks to Natalia 
Skradol for the reference. 
5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jewish_ethics 
6 http://philosophy.lander.edu/oriental/main.html 
7From personal conversations with Buddhist friends. 
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mindfulness, and insight).8 Islam, apparently, admits no fewer than thirty-six 
virtues.9 Back in the Western tradition, besides the three “theological virtues” of 1 
Corinthians 13, St Paul’s epistles are awash with other lists of desirable 
characteristics for Christians to display: “the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, 
patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, humility, and self-control” (Galatians 
5.22-23). (More on these lists later.) Much of the Secunda Pars of Aquinas’ Summa 
Theologiae is dedicated to making out and defending one long and intricate list of 
virtues and sub-virtues, graces and gifts and fruits, centered on, but not confined 
to, Aquinas’ fusion of the Classical Greek and Roman Christian lists into one list of 
seven virtues.10Hymns, too, often contain catalogues of desired virtues, even if in 
some cases what the catalogue is apt to prompt today is the retort “Not desired by 
me”: 
 
Let holy charity  
Mine outward vesture be, 
And lowliness become mine inner clothing;  
True lowliness of heart, 
Which takes the humbler part, 
And o’er its own shortcomings weeps with loathing.  
(Bianco da Siena, “Come down, O love divine”) 
 
A list of virtues that looks very different from either Bianco da Siena’s or 
Aquinas’ is derivable from what is anyway an interesting exercise in street-level 
experimental philosophy - a survey of the Lonely Hearts columns. In this 
important contemporary list, alongside the perennial favourite GSOH, the most 
important virtues probably turn out to be kindness, romanticness, liking pets, and 
being a non-smoker.   
There is this diversity even within the Western tradition which all of us here 
and now inhabit and from which most of us are culturally descended; never mind 
the further diversity outside that tradition to which we are nowadays equally 
exposed. So it looks hopeless for any virtue ethicist to simply accept a list of 
virtues wholesale from her society or tradition, and just construct a virtue ethics 
uncritically upon that unquestioned basis. This makes it all the more striking that 
the Nicomachean Ethics might seem to do exactly that. In NE 2.7, from 1106a34 
onwards Aristotle just introduces one virtue after another for discussion, “taking 
them” (as he disarmingly says there) “from the diagram”. (We are presumably to 
imagine that he has a blackboard or the like next to him as he speaks these words.)  
 
                                           
8 http://www.buddhapadipa.org/meditation/10-virtues/ 
9 http://islam.ru/en/content/story/36-islamic-everyday-virtues 
10 For a fine study of Aquinas on the virtues (and related characteristics) see A. Pinsent, The 
Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas's Ethics: Virtues and Gifts, London, Routledge, 2011. 
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Aristotle’s Book 2 list of virtues includes only three of Plato’s four cardinal 
virtues, and adds in seven other virtues as well. It runs: andreia, sophrosynê, 
eleutheria, megaloprepeia, megalopsychia, praotês/ philia, alêtheia, eutrapêlia, nemesis, 
dikaiosynê. (Wisdom, both theoretical and practical, he leaves to Book 6.) Aristotle 
makes no attempt to say (explicitly) why these and just these are the virtues that 
ought to be in his diagram. The list of virtues that he goes through in NE 2.7, 
where his main concern is clearly to establish the doctrine of the mean, he goes 
through again, in greater depth and generality, in NE 3.6-5.11. (But with two 
small modifications: (a) second time around he either forgets or deliberately leaves 
out nemesis; (b) at 1126a20 he oddly says that the virtue that comes after 
megalopsychia in his list is nameless, though it seems to be the same as what the 
first list called praotês (1108a7)or philia (1108a28).) Second time around just as first 
time, Aristotle says nothing to justify his list of virtues: neither when he begins it 
at 1115a4, nor at any later point. 
At the very least there is a sharp contrast here with Plato, whose entire career 
as an ethicist is devoted to the question which the virtues are, and why. If 
Aristotle seems to incline towards an uncritical traditionalism, Plato inclines, on 
the contrary, towards a hypercritical rationalism. For him, above all in the 
Republic, it is of the utmost importance to be able to give a complete theoretical 
justification of his list of the virtues: especially justice, of course, but the other 
cardinal virtues too, since justice cannot be defined with full clarity except relative 
to them. Famously, he sees the virtues as emerging one by one from his city-soul 
analogy, though perhaps not in the way that we might antecedently have 
expected. Courage, andreia, is the distinctive virtue of the warrior class in 
Callipolis, as it is of that part of the individual psyche that Plato calls the thumos; 
and wisdom, sophia, presumably is the distinctive virtue of the ruling guardians, as 
it is of the nous or intellect in the individual. But sophrosynê, temperance, is not the 
distinctive virtue of the lowest order of Callipolis, the wealth creators or business 
class, even though they are paralleled with the individual’s epithumiai, base 
desires. Of course that class, as much as any other, needs to have the virtues; but it 
has no distinctive virtue. Temperance is not its distinctive virtue; rather, 
temperance is an agreement in all parts of the city, or soul, about which part 
should rule, and thus comes to sound uncomfortably close to justice as Plato 
defines it (Republic 443b), which is the condition of the city, or soul, when each 
part within it knowingly and willingly performs its own proper function and no 
other part’s.   
But perhaps, on second thoughts, something like Plato’s schema for generating 
the virtues is still present, albeit not explicitly spelled out, in the Nicomachean 
Ethics? There, it could be said, the cardinal virtues can be imagined to emerge in 
orderly sequence, in parallel with Aristotle’s review of human nature “upwards” 
from its lowest to its highest parts, in NE 1.13. As this picture has it, temperance 
regulates our desire for pleasure, and courage regulates our fear of pain; then 
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justice is there to give right order to our relations to our fellow-citizens. As for 
wisdom, which had been the fourth and highest of Plato’s virtues, this maintains 
its preeminence in Aristotle’s thought, but with a curious duplication in its nature 
(which is also presaged in numerous places in Plato, beginning with Meno97a-c’s 
famous admission that true belief can be as good a guide as knowledge to human 
affairs): Aristotle recognizes both practical wisdom, phronêsis, as a master-virtue 
for human affairs, and also theoretical wisdom, sophia, as a virtue that takes us 
beyond the human to the divine.  
If this is, at least implicitly, the schema whereby Aristotle generates his list of 
the virtues - or at any rate four of them - we might have almost as many doubts 
about it as about Plato’s. The schema of the Republic is manifestly a creaky, 
clunky, and contrived way to generate a list of virtues. The psychological schema 
that I have just suggested might be attributed to Aristotle is a vast improvement 
on Plato’s schema, but it is still extremely rough and ready. Of course, that might 
actually be an advantage: given the extremely crude psychological science that 
was available to him, Aristotle could hardly have done better by basing his schema 
of the virtues on a preciser psychology.  
Nonetheless, modern-day Aristotelian virtue ethicists do not typically go in 
this psychological direction if they want to give a foundation for a list of the 
virtues. They look instead to the notion of eudaimonia. Aristotle, as we have just 
seen, simply presents us with a list of virtues; he never says explicitly that he is 
going to generate a list of virtues from the contours of human psychology. No 
more does he ever say explicitly that he is going to generate a list of virtues by 
asking “What are the character-traits that humans need in order to live flourishing 
lives?” That has not deterred a host of attentive and intelligent readers, with 
Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse at the forefront of the host, from 
concluding that this is what he is really up to in his ethics.  
One attraction of this conclusion - we are told - is that it makes Aristotle into 
what, in modern terms, is called a “naturalistic ethicist”; another, connected, 
attraction is that it seems to make his ethics dovetail very neatly with biological 
science. Now I am pretty sure that Aristotle would not only have found the 
concept of “naturalistic ethics” unintelligible himself - he would have insisted too 
that we don’t really understand what we mean by it either.11 This possibility has 
not deterred Philippa Foot and her followers. One crucial advantage they claim is 
that, on their reading, ethics can be given a descriptive or factual grounding. What 
makes humans flourish or fail to flourish is, Foot liked to point out, a matter of 
biological or zoological fact, just as it is a matter of biological fact what makes a 
plant or a tree flourish. What the traits are that lead to this flourishing are also, 
therefore, at least in principle factually establishable. Hence there is such a thing 
                                           
11 For more on this see my “Aristotle’s naturalism”, in A Companion to Greek and Roman Political 
Thought, Ryan Balot ed., Oxford, Blackwell’s, 2009. 
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as the unique objectively correct list of the virtues, and the contents of that list 
can, at least partly, be read off the nature of human beings as a zoological species 
in nature.  
As some species of animals need a lookout, or as herds of elephants need an old 
she-elephant to lead them to a watering-hole, so human societies need leaders, 
explorers, and artists. Failure to perform a special role can here be a defect in a 
man or a woman who is not ready to contribute what he or she alone - or best - 
can give. There is also something wrong with the rest of us if we do not support 
those of genius, or even of very special talent, in their work. 
In spite of the diversity of human goods - the elements that can make up 
good human lives - it is therefore possible that the concept of a good human 
life plays the same part in determining goodness of human characteristics and 
operations that the concept of flourishing plays in the determination of 
goodness in plants and animals. So far the conceptual structure seems to be 
intact. Nor is there any reason to think that it could not be in place even in the 
evaluations that are nowadays spoken of as the special domain of morality… 
Men and women need to be industrious and tenacious of purpose not only so as 
to be able to house, clothe, and feed themselves, but also to pursue human 
ends having to do with love and friendship. They need the ability to form 
family ties, friendships, and special relations with neighbours. They also need 
codes of conduct. And how could they have all these things without virtues 
such as loyalty, fairness, kindness, and in certain circumstances obedience? 
Why then should there be surprise at the suggestion that the status of 
certain dispositions as virtues should be determined by quite general facts 
about human beings?12 
One obvious objection to this philosophical programme – zoological 
naturalism, as we might call it - is that it is one thing for an ethics to dovetail with 
Aristotle’s biological science, and quite another for it to dovetail with our biological 
science.13 There is no such thing in modern evolutionary zoology as the notion of 
flourishing. For evolution, the only thing that counts is surviving long enough to 
pass on your genes, and for that it is simply immaterial whether you are 
flourishing or not. In many species, the may-fly for example, breeding is something 
that happens very late in the life-cycle, when the organism is already literally 
falling apart.14Or consider the praying mantis: when the female praying mantis 
eats the male after they have mated, is the male flourishing? 
                                           
12 P. Foot, Natural Goodness: 44-5. 
13For more on this objection see James Lenman, “The saucer of mud, the kudzu vine, and the 
uxorious cheetah: against neo-Aristotelain naturalism in metaethics”, European Journal of 
Applied Philosophy 1.2 (2005): 27-50. 
14http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/189544/mayfly/39534/Mating-and-egg-deposition: 
“Mating takes place soon after the final moult. In most species death ensues shortly after mating 
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But it did not, if you ask me, need the emergence of modern evolutionary 
zoology to tell us that there is something wrong with flourishing, understood in the 
biologically-based way that Foot and her followers understand it, as a basis for a 
virtue ethics, or any ethics. The notion fails to fit Foot’s own requirements, in at 
least two ways.  
First, Foot and her school are resolutely anti-consequentialist (and hurrah for 
that). But zoological-naturalist virtue ethics itself is, or is very naturally 
understood as, a consequentialist view. Specifically, it is a consequentialism of the 
dispositions: it tells us to have the dispositions that will most promote flourishing. 
So zoological-naturalist virtue ethics fits the charge that Derek Parfit and Brad 
Hooker think applicable to virtue ethics in general, the charge of collapsing into at 
least indirect consequentialism.15 
Secondly, if we are going to resist what Hursthouse likes to mock as “high-
mindedness” (she takes John McDowell to be a key exemplar of this vice), and 
insist that flourishing for humans really is significantly like flourishing for wolves, 
then it seems impossible to avoid the objection that no such “low-minded” 
conception of flourishing can possibly be relied on to generate e.g. justice, charity, 
and temperance as virtues rather than, say, ferocity, cunning, and stealth. In 
conjunction with other materials, a zoological-naturalist conception of flourishing 
might produce an intuitively plausible list of virtues. But (first) there again, it 
might not. And secondly, when things do turn out right, it seems to be the other 
materials in the argument that have this happy effect - in particular, the account 
of human reasoning and rationality that the zoological naturalist offers - and not 
the zoological-naturalist’s distinctive account of flourishing.  
Foot and her followers are of course not unaware of these difficulties, and have 
spent much energy on attempting to address them. Hursthouse, for one, is 
particularly insistent that her account of human flourishing is not offered from a 
neutral scientific view: “Everyone who is taking the Aristotelian naturalist line 
takes it as obvious that they are not pretending to derive ethical evaluations of 
human beings from an ethically neutral human biology, but are already thinking 
______________________________ 
and… egg deposition. Winged existence may last only a few hours, although Hexagenia males may 
live long enough to engage in mating flights on two successive days, and female imagos that 
retain their eggs may live long enough to mate on either of two successive days... Mating is 
completed on the wing. After her release by the male, the female deposits her eggs and dies. A 
few species are ovoviviparous—i.e., eggs hatch within the body of the female generally as she 
floats, dying, on the surface of a stream or pond.” 
15Derek Parfit has frequently expressed this view in correspondence with me, as a reason why he 
does not need to engage with virtue ethics in, for instance, the project of conciliating the 
different moral theories that he undertakes in his On What Matters, Oxford – New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2011. Brad Hooker argues the case that Judith Jarvis Thomson’ sand Rosalind 
Hursthouse’s virtue ethics are both really forms of indirect consequentialism in his “The Collapse 
of Virtue Ethics”, Utilitas14.1 (2002): 22-40; Hursthouse responds to Hooker (though not mainly 
to this charge) in the same issue, pp.41-53. 
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of human beings in an ethically structured way”.16 But first, one suspects a little 
hyperbole here: it is less than clear that either Philippa Foot or Michael 
Thompson, for instance, doin fact take this to be obvious. And secondly, if 
Aristotelian naturalists are indeed not “pretending to derive ethical evaluations of 
human beings from an ethically neutral human biology”, then there is a serious 
question what their often fairly detailed claims about (human and other) nature 
are actually for - what work those claims do to shape their moral theory if not, as I 
have been suggesting, to ground it in the factual and descriptive matter of 
“Aristotelian categoricals” 17. Thus for Hursthouse in Chapters 9-10 of her On 
Virtue Ethics - the most plausible response to these problems that I have seen - the 
naturalistic foundation of her virtue ethics is reduced to the four points that 
humans are social, that they seek enjoyment, that the continuance of the species is 
a priority for them, and they have close and particular ties with particular others, 
especially their families.18All of which seems obviously right, and to furnish us, as 
Hursthouse says, with some important constraints on what ethics can be for 
creatures like us. Yet none of these claims seem necessarily dependent on anything 
like the kind of zoological naturalism that Foot lays out in Natural Goodness, or 
that Michael Thompson lays out in “The representation of life”.19 
What goes wrong in zoological naturalism, I think, is at least partly the 
philosopher’s characteristic mistake of over-ambition. Like Plato, the zoological 
naturalists seek a single uniquely complete and correct account of how to generate 
the virtues, from the ground up;20 like Plato, the picture they end up with is 
unconvincing.  
 
 
II 
 
It is also, I suggest, deeply un-Aristotelian. It isn’t Aristotle’s project in the 
Nicomachean Ethics to derive a list of virtues solely and exclusively from an 
account of flourishing. And this is not because his project is, rather, to derive a list 
of virtues exclusively from an account of human psychology. As already pointed 
out, it isn’t his project to derive a list of virtues at all. A fortiori, he isn’t trying to 
derive a list of virtues from anyone source exclusively.   
                                           
16R. Hursthouse, “Human nature and Aristotelian virtue ethics”, Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Supplement 70 (2012): 169-188, p.174. 
17P. Foot, Natural Goodness, chapter 2. 
18 R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, Oxford – New York, Oxford University Press, 2002. 
19In R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, and P. Quinn eds., Virtues and Reasons, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1995. 
20Hursthouse often remarks that she rejects foundationalism; but the relation of this rejection to 
her endorsement of the idea that the nature of morality, for us, depends on the natural facts 
about us, is not clear. 
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So what is he doing? Well, he’s doing what he says he’s doing in the Ethics 
itself (7.1, 1145b3-8): 
We must, as in all other cases, set the observed facts before us and, after first 
discussing the difficulties, go on to prove, if possible, the truth of all the 
common opinions … or, failing this, of the greater number and the most 
authoritative; for if we both refute the objections and leave the common 
opinions undisturbed, we shall have proved the case sufficiently. 
Aristotle’s thoughts about the virtues, and his presuppositions about which is 
the right list of the virtues, begin in and with his own tradition. As he explains 
here, that does not mean that his ethics is necessarily wide open to the relativist 
accusation that he simply takes a list of virtues for granted. Tithenai ta 
phainomena is sometimes translated as “accept the appearances”; but “posit them 
as a starting point” would be better. What Aristotle undertakes to do in these lines 
– which happen to be prefaced to his discussion of akrasia, but could stand as his 
statement of method at almost any point in his writings – is to start from the 
endoxa (common opinions) of tradition; but not to end there. The common 
opinions, the traditional views that we’ve inherited, are to be exposed to each 
other, to check their internal consistency. But they are also to be exposed to 
whatever “difficulties” (aporiai) they may seem intuitively to face. And this - I 
suggest, though I admit the point can’t be proved - is not just a test of their 
internal coherence, but also of their correspondence to the way things are in the 
world beyond them.  
The method that I think we can draw out of Aristotle’s words here is not just a 
method for arriving at a list of the virtues; it is a method of quite general 
usefulness in philosophy. As John McDowell puts it: 
It is a deep truth that all thinking, just as such, is anchored in traditions. 
Reflection has nothing to go on, anywhere, but a putative grasp of the that, 
which (at least to begin with) is merely inherited.21 
The method is not the Cartesian one of getting rid of everything we already 
think, and trying to start somewhere else, somewhere suspended in the vacuous 
abyss of “pure inquiry”. The method, rather, is to start from everything we already 
think, and subject it, not to one single all-purpose philosophical test (such as, for 
instance, Cartesian doubt), but to a variety of different tests and questions that we 
can use, not usually just to abandon our initial view, but to refine it.  
This way we can have the great advantage of traditionalism or conservatism, 
that it starts off with our pre-philosophical opinions. (As Aristotle says in NE 
1173a1-3, there isn’t really anywhere else to start.) Yet we avoid its great 
disadvantage, that of being insufficiently critical about those starting-points for 
                                           
21 J. McDowell, The Engaged Intellect, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 2013, p.57. 
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thought. The critical element is supplied by the questions and tests that we apply 
to our initial presumptions. And our balance, our common sense, and our 
resistance to fanciful skepticisms are all preserved by the fact that it is questions, 
plural, and tests, plural. Pace writers like Peter Singer,22 there isn’t one super-
methodology that does away with pre-philosophical common sense. Rather, there 
is a variety of methods for adjusting it, with none of those methods being 
preeminent and exclusively correct, and the correct application of them being, as 
always, a matter of judgment.  
This way we can also have the advantages of systematic and constructive 
philosophy, that it will actually be possible for us to present an interesting positive 
and structured view as our philosophical position, rather than courting the 
familiar accusation that we are “quietists” or “conservatives” or “just being 
negative” (or opposed to what we might call edifactiousness23). Yet we avoid the 
great disadvantage of system-building philosophy, that we make it look as if our 
theoretical structure were the only possible one, or as if our philosophical approach 
were all-or-nothing. We are freed of the supposed duty to derive our list of the 
virtues “from the ground up”, so that our derivation is either the only possible one 
and completely inexpugnable, or else completely impossible and a complete failure. 
This cautious and piecemeal methodology, balancing a default presumption in 
favour of received opinion with a willingness to revise it for sufficiently good 
philosophical reasons, and balancing an openness to the sheer variety of what 
“good philosophical reasons” might be with a healthy skepticism about the 
philosophical fanaticism or monocularism that again and again becomes fixated 
with just one sort of philosophical reason - this, I want to suggest, is the truly 
Aristotelian method in philosophy, and the method that Aristotle himself tries to 
apply: with resounding success at times, and resounding failure at other times. In 
philosophy in general, there are explanations for most things, but there is no one 
explanation which is the explanation for even most, let alone all, things. In ethics 
in particular, there are reasons that ground most cases of rightness and wrongness, 
goodness and badness, but there is no one foundational reason, or kind of reasons, 
that grounds everything, or anywhere near everything. If we liked we might call 
this an intuitionist method, in the methodological sense of “intuitionism” that 
Bernard Williams endorses in “What does intuitionism imply?”.24 Or we might 
prefer to keep things simple, and just call the method common sense. 
                                           
22See Peter Singer, “Ethics and intuition”, Journal of Ethics 9 (2005): 331-352. For a forceful 
reply see James Lenman, “Scepticism about intuition”, in Sophie Grace Chappell ed., Intuition, 
Theory, Anti-Theory in Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp.24-39. 
23 John Maynard Keynes’ word for Henry Sidgwick, in Keynes’ well-known letter to Lytton 
Strachey, quoted by Williams in Making Sense of Humanity, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1995, p.155. 
24In B. Williams, Making Sense of Humanity, pp. 182-191. 
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III 
 
I have abjured the search for one test or criterion that, all on its own, will give us a 
complete and definitive list of the virtues; I prefer talk of tests and criteria - plural. 
So what is in this plurality of tests, and how do the various individual tests 
interact to give us the right results? And how can we be sure they won’t interact to 
give us the wrong results? (An obvious piece of arithmetic shows that the number 
of possible interactions of the tests is a much larger number than the number of the 
tests: so this multiplicity might seem really worrying.) 
The answer to the how-can-we-be-sure question is, of course, that we can’t be 
sure (in advance): that is what I meant by talking, a moment ago, about 
judgement. What we can be sure of is that intelligible argument about what the 
virtues are will always be conducted by appeal to these tests. But there is no 
guarantee that all intelligible argument about the list of the virtues will be 
plausible argument about the list of the virtues. Working out what is wrong with 
an implausible argument, or an implausible list, will often be a subtle and delicate 
matter, and will usually be a case-by-case one too.  
We should enter another reservation too at this point, and before we go any 
further. This is about the supposed definitiveness or objectivity of the list of the 
virtues that we might hope to end up with by deploying the multi-criterial and 
intuitionist method that I have sketched. Here too there is a contrast with the 
over-ambition, as I see it, of zoological naturalism, which as we saw above, at least 
aims to give us a completely objective and definitive list of virtues, in principle 
applicable to all societies, but as far as I can see, specific to none.25 These claim 
strikes me as implausibly over-ambitious; and as unnecessary, even for those who, 
like me and the zoological naturalists, agree in endorsing moral realism. 
Notice here the philosophical advantages of moral realism over moral irrealism 
of whatever stripe. If moral irrealism is the thesis that no moral propositions are 
objectively true or false, moral realism is simply the negation of that thesis. Moral 
irrealism, therefore, is refuted by a single example of a moral proposition that is 
objectively true, or false; moral irrealism is intolerant of objectivity.26 Moral 
realism, by contrast, need not be at all intolerant of subjectivity: since it is the 
thesis that some moral propositions are objectively true or false - and of course, 
preferably the central and important ones - there is room for subjectivity within 
moral realism, in a way that there cannot be room for objectivity within moral 
irrealism.  
So in the present case, while the moral irrealist cannot say that there is - really, 
ultimately - any such thing as the correct list of virtues, and must say that there is 
                                           
25 “Morality which is no particular society's morality is to be found nowhere”: MacIntyre, After 
Virtue , Second (corrected) edition (with Postscript), Norfolk, Duckworth, pp.265-266. 
26 Cp. Timothy Chappell, Ethics and Experience, Durham, Acumen, 2011, p.42. 
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no such thing, the moral realist is free to say either that there is or isn’t such a 
correct list. Provided the moral realist takes something(and, of course, something 
important) to be objective, there isn’t even an apparent threat to his moral realism 
if he denies that lists of virtues are objective, or are fully objective.  
Well, I am a moral realist; and although I don’t actually want to go as far as 
outright denial that there is such a thing as the correct list of the virtues, I do want 
to say that there is often something rather beside the point about anxious queries 
whether this or that list of the virtues is or is not “objectively correct”. To take it 
that lists of the virtues are actually meant, by those who propound them, to be - 
and to be nothing but - flatly descriptive of an antecedently given reality seems to 
me a rather naïve kind of literalism. Very often the intentions of those who offer us 
such lists are, and are patently, prescriptive rather than descriptive. They are not 
so much attempts to describe a reality that is already there, as to summon a reality 
into being by sketching an ideal and exhorting one’s hearers to live up to it.  
This hortatory function of lists of virtues has a number of explanatory 
applications. For one thing, it makes it perfectly explicable, for the moral realist, 
why there should be so many differences between different societies’ lists of 
virtues. Some of those differences no doubt do reflect substantive philosophical 
disagreements: consider, for instance, the differences noted by MacIntyre between 
Jesus’ and Aristotle’s conceptions of the virtues, or again the differences between 
the virtues of a Socrates and those of a Thrasymachus.27 But many other 
differences are merely a matter of emphasis or of the division of topics. Between 
somebody who (say) takes gentleness to be a primary virtue and humility to be an 
offshoot or subcategory of gentleness, and someone who sees things the other way 
round, there need be no more than a difference in the order of exposition. 
The hortatory function of lists of virtues is particularly obvious, I want to 
suggest, in the writings of a figure who - along with Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas - 
is one of the three or four most influential propounders of lists of the virtues that 
Western ethics has ever seen, namely Paul of Tarsus. One list of his we have cited 
already: 
 
The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, 
faithfulness, humility, and self-control.  
ὁ δὲ καρπὸς τοῦ πνεύματός ἐστιν ἀγάπη, χαρά, εἰρήνη, μακροθυμία, χρηστότης, ἀγαθωσύνη, 
πίστις, πραΰτης, ἐγκράτεια: κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστιν νόμος. (Galatians 5.22-23) 
There are plenty of others: 
So, as those who have been chosen of God, holy and beloved, put on a heart of 
compassion, kindness, humility, gentleness and patience; bearing with one 
                                           
27See Timothy Chappell, “The virtues of Thrasymachus”, Phronesis 38(1993): 1-17. 
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another, and forgiving each other, whoever has a complaint against anyone; 
just as the Lord forgave you, so also should you forgive each other. Beyond all 
these things put on love, which is the perfect bond of unity. Let the peace of 
Christ rule in your hearts, to which indeed you were called in one body; and be 
thankful. Let the word of Christ richly dwell within you, with all wisdom 
teaching and admonishing one another with psalms and hymns and spiritual 
songs, singing with thankfulness in your hearts to God. Whatever you do in 
word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks through Him 
to God the Father. (Colossians 3.12-17) 
Finally, brethren, whatever is true, whatever is honourable, whatever is right, 
whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is of good repute, if there is any 
excellence and if anything worthy of praise, think on these things. (Philippians 
4.8)28 
Let all bitterness and wrath and anger and clamour and slander be put away 
from you, along with malice. Be kind to one another, tender-hearted, forgiving 
each other, just as God in Christ also has forgiven you. (Ephesians 4.31-32)29 
It isn’t that there are no standards of correctness for such lists; if St Paul had 
recommended that the Ephesian Christians seek not only to be kind, forgiving, and 
tender-hearted, but also louche and cynical, there would have been something 
wrong with that. Or if he had recommended that the church at Philippi think not 
only on the true and the lovely, but also on the crafty, that too would have 
justified a readerly double-take. There are standards of correctness for these lists, 
but the standards are standards for exhortatory, not for descriptive, catalogues. 
Contrast the zoological naturalists and their would-be straight-descriptive lists of 
dispositions that, as a matter of fact, promote flourishing. 
Though come to think of it, perhaps the zoological naturalists are also wrong 
about the sort of list that their account of the virtues implies: perhaps a list of the 
characteristics that, say, a wolf needs in order to live a life that is long, healthy, 
and largely undisturbed except by predation-opportunities is also rather more 
open-ended than they like to admit. (One obvious thought that points in this 
direction: what those characteristics are is determined in large part by the wolf’s 
environment; and environments change.) Still, as I say, their list is (at least 
                                           
28 Is this a list of virtues at all? Isn’t it rather a list of things to meditate on?” It is certainly the 
latter; its being the latter does not preclude its also being the former, since these subjects of 
meditation are apparently classes of actions or of the dispositions that produce them. Though 
even if it isn’t a list of virtues, the relevance to a virtue ethics of such a list of reflective practices, 
or topics for reflective practice, is obvious; it is a key part of virtue—Paul is telling us—to reflect 
on things like these. 
29 And of course behind all St Paul’s lists of virtues stands Jesus’ list, the Beatitudes: Matthew 
5.1-12. 
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intended as) a straight-descriptive list: it is meant to capture the facts about what 
characteristics actually achieve or tend to achieve a supposedly given end, namely 
biological or quasi-biological flourishing. If such a descriptive catalogue of the 
virtues is, in fact, open-ended, it will be so for quite different reasons from the 
reasons that make for open-endedness with St Paul’s lists of virtues and ideals.  
We are close here to the large and interesting question, what a list of the 
virtues is supposed to be for anyway; exhortation has been suggested as one 
possible function, but maybe there are others. At any rate it would be bizarre to 
suppose that the list of the virtues is meant to be deployed directly in agents’ 
deliberation, as their main means of thinking about what to do. The zoological 
naturalists do not suppose this: that is why Hursthouse often invokes the notion of 
the “v-thoughts”, the thoughts that motivate the virtuous person, which can be 
but are not necessarily coincidental with the thoughts about the virtues that, 
according to her, give the criterion of rightness for all action.  
It has often been argued that this manoeuvre rescues Hursthouse’s virtue 
ethics from an implausible picture of how agents deliberate, at the price of making 
the very distinction between deliberative procedure (DP) and criterion of rightness 
(CR) that makes so much trouble for utilitarianism.30 Without getting too deeply 
into this debate here, I will say simply that the DP/ CR distinction in itself seems 
to me entirely unproblematic. The problem comes only when a theory is forced to 
suppose that an agent is bound to entertain thoughts on the one side of the 
distinction that subvert or contradict thoughts that she is bound to entertain on 
the other side. Utilitarianism of every variety known to me is clearly refuted by its 
failure to avoid this problem about internal consistency; it is less clear that every 
version of virtue ethics is. 
Anyway, St Paul’s practice gives us further evidence that is that there are 
other things that lists of virtues can be for, besides straightforward description of 
moral reality, and the equipping of the agent with materials for (more or less 
direct) deliberation, and for devising and applying a criterion of rightness. A list of 
virtues can also be for meditative attention: it can be an ideal, or constellation of 
ideals, that we reflect on in order to internalize. It is clear that St Paul thinks that 
such meditative attention is a powerful form of moral discipline, and a powerful 
source of moral transformation. And on that, of course, modern thinkers such as 
Iris Murdoch will agree with him. 
 
 
                                           
30For a fine discussion of the issues, and of the two main sources of the charge in work by Tom 
Hurka and Simon Keller, see Glen Pettigrove, “Is virtue ethics self-effacing?”, Journal of Ethics15.3 
(2011): 191-207. 
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So though there are certainly (according to realists like me) antecedent realities 
that a list of the virtues needs to fit, presenting a list of virtues is not merely a 
matter of describing antecedent realities. As the case of St Paul makes clear, it is 
also, at least as much, a matter of prescribing: of exhorting one’s hearers to see 
things in a certain light, to dispose themselves in particular ways, to attempt to 
approximate some ideal or ideals, and to “think on” those ideals: to reflectively 
internalise them.  
We can keep this thought in mind as we turn to the question that section III 
left outstanding, the question of what the tests are that should determine our list 
of the virtues. After the remarks I have just made about the exhortatory value of 
such lists, it would be odd to attempt to offer a complete and definitive answer to 
this. But I will offer three suggestions. The first is about eudaimonia; the second is 
about the notion of a technê or practice; and the third brings us back to the idea of 
reflecting on and imitating ideals or exemplars. 
The first suggestion, then, is just the idea that the notion of human flourishing 
or eudaimonia can give us some help in formulating a list of virtues. Perhaps it 
looks as if I have already excluded all reference to eudaimonia; but actually what I 
have rejected is eudaimonism, by which in this context I mean the view that the 
point of the virtues is to promote eudaimonia, and so that our list of the virtues 
can be derived solely from thinking about what promotes human flourishing. I 
have denied this in particular where the notion of flourishing that we are working 
with has the misleadingly scientific look of zoological-naturalistic flourishing. But 
to deny these claims is not to deny that there is anything to the notion of human 
flourishing. Of course there is, but the notion is a “folk” notion, not a scientific 
one: what we count as flourishing is not part of our science but of our form of life.31 
My second suggestion arises from MacIntyre’s discussion of the nature of the 
virtues in After Virtue. MacIntyre’s approach rephrases the question “Which 
character-traits are the virtues?” as the question “What character-traits do we 
need for successful pursuit of the practices?” His account of what a practice is - the 
notion has obvious affinities to Aristotle’s and Plato’s notion of a technê - is this: 
 
Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in 
the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to, and partially definitive of that form of activity, with the result 
that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends 
and the goods involved, are systematically extended.32 
                                           
31A point which, as we have seen, the zoological naturalists of course attempt, at least 
sometimes, to accommodate. In my view, not successfully; but that is an argument for another 
time. 
32MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 187. 
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Examples of practices that MacIntyre gives include farming, chess, music, 
science, history, novel-writing, and (a very Aristotelian example, this) politics. As 
MacIntyre brings out, the mark of all these practices is that in order to practise 
them, one needs honesty, humility, preparedness to learn from others, and 
responsiveness to the legitimate demands of others: so one needs something very 
like justice. One also needs persistence and self-discipline – so something very like 
temperance – and the optimism to keep going when the practice seems impossibly 
difficult or overwhelmingly complicated: so something very like courage. And 
what one learns through the practices is how human understanding and expertise 
is articulated in particular cases and contexts, and how to move from those 
particular contexts and apply their lessons to the overall context of living our 
lives: so something like wisdom too. 
The flourishing of the virtues requires and in turn sustains a certain kind of 
community, necessarily a small-scale community, within which the goods of 
various practices are ordered, so that, as far as possible, regard for each finds 
its due place within the lives of each individual, or each household, and in the 
life of the community at large. Because, implicitly or explicitly, it is always by 
reference to some conception of the overall and final human good that other 
goods are ordered, the life of every individual, household or community by its 
orderings gives expression, wittingly or unwittingly, to some conception of the 
human good. And it is when goods are ordered in terms of an adequate 
conception of human good that the virtues genuinely flourish. “Politics” is the 
Aristotelian name for the set of activities through which goods are ordered in 
the life of the community.33 
We do not learn the virtues only through the practices; but that is one very 
obvious place where we do learn them. When we look at the dispositions of 
character that are required for expertise in some particular practice, what we 
arrive at very quickly comes to look pretty much like a list of the virtues that we 
need in any practice, and in the living of our lives overall.  
Here then is a second way of arriving at some ideas about what the virtues are. 
It is a way that Iris Murdoch at least gestures towards as well: 
If I am learning Russian, I am confronted by an authoritative structure which 
commands my respect. The task is difficult and the goal is distant and perhaps 
never entirely attainable. My work is a progressive revelation of something 
which exists independently of me. Attention is rewarded by a knowledge of 
reality. Love of Russian leads me away from myself towards something alien 
to me, something which my consciousness cannot take over, swallow up, deny 
                                           
33MacIntyre, Preface to the Polish edition of After Virtue. 
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or make unreal. The honesty and humility required of the student - not to 
pretend to know what one does not know - is the preparation for the honesty 
and humility of the scholar who does not even feel tempted to suppress the 
fact which damns his theory... Studying is normally an exercise of virtue as 
well as of talent, and shows us a fundamental way in which virtue is related to 
the real world.34 
My third and final suggestion about the tests that we might use to derive a 
credible list of the virtues is that at least some of the content of any plausible list 
of virtues is generated by thinking about examples of good people, and especially of 
remarkably good people - saints, or ideals, or exemplars of the virtues.  
Exemplarism, the thesis that we can derive our conception of the virtues from 
thinking about exemplars of the virtues, is a venerable and important part of the 
virtue tradition. One way to develop it I deployed myself, in a paper that I toured 
for a couple of years in the early nineties without ever managing to get it 
published. The idea was to work from thin descriptions to thick: the key question 
was “If you know of Jane only that she is a good person, what further descriptions 
may you reasonably expect to be true of Jane?” I thought then, and twenty-five 
years later I still think, that there can be an interesting answer to this that gives us 
a good deal of information about the nature of the virtues. To be sure, we get that 
information in the form of a long, loose and defeasible disjunction; and to be sure, 
the information we thus get is filtered via my or our reasonable expectations, 
which no doubt are both cognitively imperfect and culture-relative. But these 
points are philosophical commonplaces. They constitute serious obstacles only to 
an attempt to use this “key question” as the unique method that definitively gets us 
to everything we need to know about the correct list of the virtues. As should be 
obvious by now, I am not in that game at all; I doubt I was, really, even in 1991.  
In recent philosophy the exemplarist approach to virtue ethics has been 
argued for by other strategies than the one I tried out in that old draft of mine: by 
Linda Zagzebski in one way 35, and by me in another36. For both Zagzebski and 
myself, Aristotle is the source and authority for this thesis whom we quote the 
most, though we could also have quoted St Paul, who repeatedly tells the readers 
of his letters to imitate Jesus (e.g. Galatians 3.27, Philippians 2.5, Ephesians 4.14). 
(Paul also tells them to imitate himself at least twice: 1 Corinthians 11.1, 
Philippians 3.17.).The Christian tradition has made rich use of exemplarism: that, 
for instance, is one reason why the church has the lives of saints to meditate on.  
                                           
34I. Murdoch, The Sovereignty of God, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970: 89. 
35 L. Zagzebski, “The admirable life and the desirable life”, in T. Chappell ed., Values and 
Virtues, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007. 
36 T. Chappell, “The good man is the measure of all things”, in Christopher Gill ed., Virtue, 
Norms, and Objectivity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Lists of the virtues 
91 
Part of the point of exemplarism is, as Zagzebskistresses, that a living 
exemplar of a given virtue gives us far more detailed information about what the 
virtue actually involves than any abstract description or definition of that virtue 
could. We might say, as she does, that what we learn from the exemplar is 
basically knowledge by direct ostension – “The virtue is like that”– rather than 
knowledge by definition. Or we might make what seems to be a closely-related 
point, that what the exemplar gives us is not, or not only, explicit and 
propositional knowledge of the virtue, but also tacit and non-propositional 
knowledge of what it is like for someone to have that virtue; or perhaps practical 
knowledge – knowledge how to exercise the virtue. Or again, we could observe with 
Iris Murdoch that attention to exemplars of virtue – those found in novels and 
plays, to give two obvious examples – feeds our imagination and our moral vision 
in a richer and psychologically deeper way than if-and-only-if equations do. Or we 
might make all of these points, as in fact I think we should; they seem perfectly 
consistent with each other. And what they add up to, in combination, is a striking 
picture of how much more there can be to moral knowledge than straightforwardly 
propositional knowledge.  
How, though, do exemplars get established as exemplars? Very often, I 
suggest, it is because some person or some deed comes across to us as immediately 
admirable. In print or in person, we come across some Gandhi or St Francis or 
Martin Luther King or Sophie Scholl, and that person strikes us - directly and 
primitively - as awesome, as having done something noble or wonderful, perhaps 
even beautiful. Two well-known cases of this sort of experience are given by Rai 
Gaita early on in Good and Evil: the cases of the nun in the hospital working 
selflessly and unendingly to relieve the sufferings of her patients, and Primo Levi’s 
description of the sufferings of Ladmaker in Auschwitz: “Charles’s behaviour 
showed a goodness to marvel at”.37 
What thinking about exemplarism gets us to see here, in fact, is something 
that we might find profoundly missing from approaches to virtue ethics such as 
zoological naturalism. It is that any plausible and attractive list of the virtues is 
going to depend at least as much on the notion of the morally fine or beautiful – in 
Greek, on to kalon – as on the notion of flourishing or the advantageous – in Greek, 
on to ophelimon. The virtues are not just the dispositions that tend to lead us to the 
desirable life. They are also, and perhaps even more fundamentally, the dispositions 
the exercise of which is admirable, and makes us admirable people.38 (But the point, 
of course, is to be admirable, not to be admired; it is to have in us what necessarily 
makes admiration apt, not what actually prompts admiration. Here talk of the 
beautiful is preferable to talk of the admirable, precisely because it lacks this 
misleading connotation.) 
                                           
37R. Gaita, Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception, London , Macmillan, 1991, xvii. 
38 For the admirable/ desirable contrast cp. Linda Zagzebski, op.cit. 
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We can put this as a point about the familiar old question “Why be moral?”.39 
So put, the point is that the answer to “Why be moral?” is quite often “Because 
that is the beautiful thing to do”. It’s not that the moral act is itself prudentially 
disastrous, but just happens to be, unfortunately enough, one of a class to the 
whole of which we are somehow committed, if we are committed to any part of it - 
as theories like rule-consequentialism and Gauthier’s contractualism too often tend 
to suggest. Nor is that the moral act is prudentially advantageous in some way - 
just a very obscure way, one which is consistent with the fact that the moral act is 
attended with terrible penalties like those that Hans and Sophie Scholl faced, or 
those described by Calliclesin Plato’sGorgias(486b). We need not think that there is 
any prudential advantage, in any sense, in the gravely-sacrificial moral act. (Notice 
here how close to the surface we find a false assumption that I have criticised 
elsewhere:40 that reasons for action have to be future-directed.) At least in some 
cases, advantage simply isn’t the point. It is rather that the moral act demands to 
be done even if it does involve a grave sacrifice - just because it is beautiful. 
Perhaps this appeal to to kalon, The Beautiful, is the answer to the puzzlement 
expressed by the person who said of Sophie Scholl and those who suffered with her 
that “the fact that five little kids, in the mouth of the wolf where it really counted, 
had the tremendous courage to do what they did, is spectacular to me. I know that 
the world is better for them having been there, but I do not know why.”41 Perhaps 
it is also the best answer to the difficulty that Philippa Foot is struggling with in 
her rather convoluted discussion of the “Letter-Writers”, a group of victims of the 
Nazis who thought it was worthwhile to die rather than to give in to Hitler42. 
Foot’s difficulty is, precisely, to square the Letter-Writers’ willingness to die, and 
their obvious virtue, with Foot’s own eudaimonism: the virtues are supposed to 
lead, or at least tend to lead, to flourishing, and here the virtues are, in all their 
glory, leading their possessors directly to death. (And not only leading but tending 
to lead, given the nature of Hitler’s Germany.) Despite repeated study of what 
Foot says about their case, I am not entirely sure how she thinks their case can be 
squared with the eudaimonist idea, which goes back at least to Socrates, that “the 
virtues benefit their possessor”. But I know how I want to respond to their case. 
On the grounds precisely of cases like the Letter-Writers’, I simply deny that the 
virtues do necessarily benefit, or even tend to benefit, their possessor. As the 
                                           
39 The next two paragraphs draw on Chapter Eight of Knowing What To Do. Imagination, 
Virtue, and Platonism in Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014. 
40In Chapter Three of Knowing What To Do. 
41 Lillian Garrett-Groag, quoted in the Wikipedia article on Sophie Scholl. The remark is 
quoted—from the same source—and discussed by Eleonore Stump in Wandering in Darkness, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010:149 and 549. In the present context we are close, of 
course, to Gaita 1991’s remarks about “a goodness to marvel at”, cited in the last chapter; there 
is bound to be some overlap between the notions of glory and of nobility. 
42P. Foot, Natural Goodness: 95-6. 
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Letter-Writers show, there are cases where the exercise of the virtues can be 
utterly disastrous for their possessor - and yet, the virtues continue steadfastly to 
point us towards “the thing to do”. For the Letter Writers, what their virtues do is 
make their possessors, and their terrible submission to the suffering that 
confronted them, admirable/ fine/ beautiful/ kalos. But that, in the circumstances, 
was the very opposite of benefiting them. 
Eudaimonia, the dispositions that we need for the practices, the power of 
examples: all of these are resources that we can appeal to when attempting to 
refine our list of the virtues, or assess whether we really think that this or that 
disposition of character is a virtue or not, and why. No doubt there are other 
resources too. My suggestion is not that any one of these resources would give us 
all we needed to derive a list of the virtues - even if deriving a list of the virtues 
from scratch, rather than refining the list(s) of the virtues that we have already 
inherited from our traditions, were really what we are engaged in doing. Rather, 
the three resources that I have looked at here suggest tests and diagnostic 
questions and criticisms that may be applied to already existing lists of the virtues. 
Such evaluation of lists of the virtues is therefore more like a matter of good 
judgment than of the application of a simple algorithm. But that, of course, is 
precisely what we would expect, and entirely as it should be. 
